always been interested in texts and their readers. In his first chapter, he urges historians to read critically, attending to written texts as texts, thinking about their language and rhetoric, and remaining alert to the indeterminacy of their meaning, and concludes that they must learn in this respect from literary scholars. This advice is offered in a vigorously controversial tone. The heart of the chapter is reached in the suggestion that historians who speak of "documents" and "evidence" rather than "texts" believe in "the availability of the past to communicate to and be seen by the historian as a clear object or lesson unmediated by representations -or time" (p. 26).
This overstatement suggests the enthusiasm of the convert. Sharpe has discovered critical theory, and sees it as a means to attain subtlety and flexibility in the interpretation of the material which interests him. "To most early modern historians," he says, "Lacan, Foucault, Derrida . . . form a gallery of unknowns or a litany of anathemas and demons" (p. 9). However, literary scholars are also increasingly unsure that reading translations of Sixties and Seventies French philosophy is the best way to attend to the texts written and read in early modern England. After all, understanding what it meant for Drake to read Polybius might be done better by reading Polybius oneself than by reading Lacan. It is in dealing with the texts which Drake read that Sharpe runs into his most serious problem. When, for instance, he writes that Drake read "on Aristotle's Ethics commentaries by Archbishop Eustratius, Andronicus of Rhodes, Ludovico Settala and Victorin Strigel" (p. 175), he makes at least four mistakes in fifteen words. The second work he mentions is a paraphrase, not a commentary, and it is not in fact by Andronicus; the third is a commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata, not the Ethics; Strigel's first name was Victorinus, not Victorin. Sharpe cannot, in the accompanying footnote, identify the text by Strigel, which is in fact a translation of and commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics published in 1572. These inaccuracies are characteristic, and their cumulative effect is disturbing. Elsewhere, Henri Estienne becomes Henry Stephens, Diogenes Laertius becomes Laertius Diogenes, and Victoria Kahn, consistently, V. Khan. Tertullian and Lactantius are described as secular classical authors, Cato the Censor and Dionysius Cato are confusedthe list could be continued. Even if historians of reading cannot hope to read all the books their subjects read, they need more knowledge of their authors' names and their approximate contents than is suggested here.
The conclusion of Reading Revolutions, that the history of reading surely merits "at least a chapter in the history of politics," is one with which it is difficult to disagree, and this is an absorbing, and in very many ways an admirable, case study in the history of reading. Sharpe has written an important book. But it is not the masterpiece which a scholar of his stature might have made from Drake's archive.
